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Last year, the Independent Counsel statute' expired and it now
appears there is a good chance that the statute will not be reenacted.
This is a welcome development, because the statute suffered from
many grave constitutional and policy defects. But if independent
counsels are eliminated, with what will we replace them? For the last
two decades, the nation has relied upon Independent Counsels to po-
lice wrongdoing by high executive branch officials. Prior to that, the
country used various institutions that Congress judged to be inade-
quate when it chose to adopt the Independent Counsel statute. Un-
fortunately, it is not easy to design an institution that effectively inves-
tigates the executive but does not overreach.
Most proposals for replacing the Independent Counsel statute use
some part of the executive branch to investigate executive miscon-
duct.2 Some of these proposals rely on officials, like the Independent
Counsel, who are independent of presidential control. Such officials,
however, are constitutionally problematic and not accountable to the
electorate. Other proposals employ officials who are subject to the
President's direction, but these approaches cannot ensure that vigor-
ous and impartial investigations will be conducted.
Instead of relying on the executive branch to investigate, I pro-
pose that we return to the system adopted by the Framers, in which
t Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. I would like to thank
Larry Alexander, Stuart Benjamin, Shaun Martin, John McGinnis, Sai Prakash, and
Mike Ramsey for their helpful comments. I am also grateful for the comments made
when this paper was given at a Federalist Society panel discussion in the Senate Office
Building in April 1999.
28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994).
2 See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text (discussing the various types of pro-
posals mentioned).
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Congress investigates executive wrongdoing. The Constitution assigns
to Congress the power to investigate and remove executive officials
through its impeachment and oversight powers.3 Under a congres-
sional investigation system, a congressional committee would uncover
executive misconduct and then issue public reports documenting it.
Disclosing this information to the public would help hold the execu-
tive politically accountable for her misbehavior. In many cases, the
disclosures would lead the President to dismiss the responsible offi-
cial. If the official were not removed, Congress could always use the
information that it uncovered as a basis for impeachment.
It is true that congressional investigations presently suffer from
certain defects. Congressional investigations are often viewed as ex-
cessively partisan, which has diminished the credibility of the informa-
tion they have uncovered. Moreover, congressional committees fre-
quently lack the powers needed to conduct effective investigations,
including the power to adequately enforce their subpoenas and to
delegate to their staffs the authority to question witnesses who are un-
der oath.
But these problems can be solved. To prevent the investigative
committee from excessive partisanship, Congress should adopt a new
method for appointing members of the committee. Congressional
rules should require the Democrats to choose the Republican mem-
bers of the committee and the Republicans to choose the Democratic
members. Under this appointment method, each party would have an
incentive to select the legislators from the opposing party who it be-
lieved would most often act based on the evidence rather than on po-
litical considerations. Each party also would not appoint members of
the opposing party who were political extremists.
The investigative committee should also be given additional pow-
ers. Congress could provide the committee with adequate authority to
enforce committee subpoenas by authorizing it to bring civil lawsuits
for this purpose. The committee should also be permitted to delegate
to its staff the power to question witnesses who are under oath. Dele-
gation of this power would reduce the burdens on committee mem-
bers, who have many other legislative responsibilities. Delegation
would also allow for more effective investigations, because the staff
would have expertise and experience that many members lack.
s See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-3 (granting the House of Representatives the power to
impeach and granting the Senate the power to try impeachments); McGrain v.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 173-75 (1927) (holding that Congress possesses the power to
"exact information in aid of the legislative function").
REPLA CING INDEPENDENT COUNSELS
This congressional investigation proposal has many virtues. First,
the proposal would establish a fully constitutional procedure. It
would not, like the Independent Counsel statute, need to bend or
break the Constitution in order to erect an effective investigative
structure. Second, the proposal would place the power of investiga-
tion in officials who are accountable to the electorate but who are en-
tirely independent of the President-an important ideal that no sys-
tem of investigations by the executive branch can achieve. Finally, the
proposal would create a fair investigative process. Unlike the Inde-
pendent Counsel statute, the proposal would not provide investigators
with an incentive to overreach and could not be easily used as a politi-
cal weapon against one's enemies.
This Essay proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the serious
problems that have plagued the Independent Counsel statute and
which would to some extent afflict all investigations by executive
branch officials. Part II describes my proposal for congressional inves-
tigations, explaining how the system would work and describing the
changes in existing practice it would require. Part III argues that the
congressional investigation proposal would be superior to investiga-
tions by the executive branch. Finally, Part IV responds to objections
and addresses additional aspects of the proposal.
I. INVESTIGATIONS BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
A. Problems with the Independent Counsel Statute
The Independent Counsel statute suffers from several serious
problems. Perhaps the most basic problem with the statute is that it is
unconstitutional. This might seem to be a peculiar claim, as the Su-
preme Court approved the constitutionality of the statute in Morrison
v. Olson But the meaning of the Constitution cannot be the exclusive
preserve of the Supreme Court. It is essential that the public be able
to criticize and disagree with Supreme Court constitutional interpreta-
tions, especially those like Morrison, which ignore text, history, and
precedent.
There are two fundamental constitutional flaws with the statute.
The first involves the method of appointing the Independent Coun-
sel. Under the statute, the Independent Counsel is appointed by a
threejudge panel The Appointments Clause of the Constitution re-
4 487 U.S. 654, 696-97 (1988).
5 See 28 U.S.C. § 593 (1994).
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quires that executive officers be appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate, but it also allows Congress to assign
the appointment of inferior officers to the judiciary.6 Thus, the judi-
cial appointment of the Independent Counsel will be constitutional
only if the Independent Counsel is classified as an inferior officer.
One cannot plausibly argue, however, that the Independent
Counsel is an inferior officer. The Independent Counsel exercises
important executive authority-the power to investigate and prose-
cute high executive branch officials, including the President-and is
not subject to the direction of any other official. An officer without a
7
superior cannot be inferior. Thus, the Independent Counsel is a
noninferior officer who must be appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate. To conclude that the Independent
Counsel was an inferior officer, the Court in Morrison was forced to
ignore this central point. Instead, the Court adopted a vague and un-
persuasive balancing test that allowed it to reach virtually any conclu-
sion it desired.8 Happily, the Court may now have recognized its mis-
take, because all nine Justices have recently joined opinions that
interpreted "inferior officer" more appropriately.9
The second constitutional flaw is that the statute deprives the
President of the power to direct and remove the Independent Coun-
sel. This insulation is obviously necessary if the Independent Counsel
is to be independent of the President. The problem, however, is that
the Constitution is best read as providing the President with the power
to direct and remove all executive branch officials." Although the
Supreme Court departed from that interpretation in the 1930s," it
had for fifty years interpreted the Constitution as permitting Congress
to make quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial officials independent of
6 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 719-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that under the
Appointments Clause, a necessary condition for an inferior officer is that he be subor-
dinate to another officer).
8 See id. at 671-73 (relying on a four-factor test without explaining the weights to be
attached to the different factors).
9 See, e.g., Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1997); id. at 666-67
(Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with the
majority that "one who has no superior is not an inferior officer").
10 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163-64 (1926); Steven G. Calabresi &
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power To Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 549
(1994) (arguing that the Constitution authorizes the President to direct all executive
officials).
n See Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627-28 (1935) (limiting the
holding of Myers to "purely executive officers").
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the President, but as requiring that the President have control over
12purely executive officials. Because officials who prosecuted criminal
cases were purely executive officers, the prevailing constitutional doc-
trine when Morrison was decided required that the Independent
Counsel be subject to presidential direction. Nonetheless, in a single
paragraph of the Morrison opinion, the Supreme Court swept away
fifty years of constitutional interpretation without the slightest effort
to justify its action.13 Even worse, the Supreme Court's new interpreta-
tion was entirely devoid of principle, leaving the question of whether
an executive official may be made independent to the unlimited dis-
cretion of the Supreme Court.
In the years since Morrison was decided, the Independent Counsel
statute has become less popular, and the Court's decision has been
increasingly criticized.4 Those who previously defended the opinion
as a wise constitutional accommodation of the need for executive ac-
countability are now more apt to recognize that Morrison' departures
from prior constitutional principle have corrupted the investigative
.15
process. In time, Morrison may even come to be viewed for what I
have always believed it to be: a cynical opinion adopted by a Court
that believed that the elite's (mistaken) view about what was good
public policy should take priority over the Constitution.
12 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 723-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
is See id. at 689-91.
14 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Now Playing A Constitutional Nightmare, WASH. POST,
Sept. 20, 1998, at Cl (blaming the Independent Counsel statute for "the unconstitu-
tional mess we find ourselves in"); Anthony Lewis, Abuse of Power, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2,
1998, at A23 (describing the Independent Counsel statute as a threat to checks and
balances); Anthony Lewis, Independent Counsel Act Must Go, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Or-
leans), Feb. 24, 1999, at B7 [hereinafter Lewis, Independent CounselAct Must Go] (argu-
ing that experience with independent counsel investigations has vindicated the dis-
senting opinion ofJustice Scalia in Morrison); Jeffrey Rosen, Kenneth Starr, Trapped, N.Y.
TIMES, June 1, 1997 (Magazine), at 42 (stating that the Independent Counsel statute
.creates a free-floating prosecutor with an ever-expanding mandate, unconstrained by
time, money or political accountability"); Cass R. Sunstein, Unchecked and Unbalanced
Why the Independent Counsel Act Must Go, AM. PROSPECr, May-June 1998, at 20, 20 (call-
ing the Independent Counsel statute "one of the most ill-conceived pieces of legisla-
tion in the last quarter century," for the statute creates "dangerous incentives" for both
the Independent Counsel and Congress); Benjamin Wittes, A Kiss ofDeathfor Independ-
ent Counsels, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 1998, at A21 (arguing that the Independent Coun-
sel statute "erodes[s] the President's legitimate powers").
15 See Editorial, Reinventing Independent Counse WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1998, at A24;
Linda Greenhouse, Ethics in Government: The Price of Good Intentions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1,
1998, § 4, at 1 (noting that Democrats, who once praised Morrison, have now found "an
eerie prescience" in Justice Scalia's dissent); Lewis, Independent Counsel Act Must Go, su-
pra note 14.
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In addition to its constitutional infirmities, the Independent
Counsel statute suffers from serious policy defects. First, the statute
unfairly provides independent counsels with an incentive to find that
the person being investigated has engaged in misconduct. 6 Because
an Independent Counsel usually has one principal target, she will of-
ten be judged a failure if she does not uncover wrongdoing sufficient
for an indictment. By contrast, an ordinary prosecutor has less incen-
tive to indict any particular individual since she will investigate many
people and will be judged on her overall performance. Moreover, the
Independent Counsel will have essentially unlimited time and re-
sources to uncover wrongdoing by the target, while an ordinary prose-
cutor must allocate her time and resources among the many cases that
come within her purview.
A second problem is that independent counsels exercise signifi-
cant discretion but are not accountable to the electorate. Independ-
ent counsels perform important duties that involve a substantial
amount of policymaking discretion, including deciding whether cer-
tain conduct by an official warrants an indictment. In a democracy,
persons who exercise such discretion are generally made accountable
to the public. Thus, Congress and the President stand for election,
and many executive officials take direction from the President. Inde-
pendent counsels, however, have virtually no accountability because
they are appointed by judges, take orders from no one, and can be
17removed only for cause.
16 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 731-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that due to a lack
of "multiple responsibilities," the Independent Counsel would pursue matters an ordi-
nary prosecutor would not); Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Incentives and Bad Institutions, 86
GEO. L.J. 2267, 2279-80 (1998) ("[T]he Act creates a strong incentive to focus intensely
on particular persons....").
It might be objected that judges in a democracy also exercise significant policy
making discretion even though they are often not accountable to the public. The dis-
cretion exercised by judges, however, is distinguishable from that of independent
counsels. First, judicial power was traditionally understood not to involve policymak-
ing. See 1 WLLAM BtLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69-71 (stating that the judicial
branch is "not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the
old one"); T1M FEDERA..ST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). In more recent generations, especially since the advent of Legal Realism, the
practice and understanding ofjudicial power has come to accept more judicial policy-
making, but even this power is subject to significant limits. Judges do not generally
exercise naked policy discretion, but claim to be implementing values established by
others. Moreover, judges only exercise limited or interstitial discretion, within the
gaps of decisions made by others. Finally, thisjudicial discretion is limited by the judi-
cial process, in which judicial decisions are justified in written opinions, reviewed on
appeal, and (at the highest levels) are made only by multimember panels. By contrast,
independent counsels are exercising a power which has traditionally been held by po-
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The Independent Counsel's lack of accountability is not merely a
problem of democratic theory, but also of democratic practice. Be-
cause the Independent Counsel is unconstrained by the fundamental
democratic check on policymaking-having to stand for election-
there is a significant danger that she will behave unreasonably. 8 The
Independent Counsel's lack of accountability also deprives her of the
political legitimacy that is crucial to the performance of her duties.
The main claim to legitimacy that the Independent Counsel has is po-
litical independence or impartiality.1 But when this impartiality is se-
riously questioned-as Kenneth Starr's was during his investigation of
President Clinton-that claim to legitimacy can easily evaporate. By
contrast, an Independent Counsel who was accountable to the elec-
torate, or to someone who had to face the electorate, could defend
himself as having been authorized by the people.
The third policy defect of the Independent Counsel statute is that
it employs a criminal prosecution model to monitor and discipline
executive branch misconduct.2 A system that monitors and disci-
plines executive officials through criminal prosecutions is problematic
litically accountable officials and which does not purport to be free of policymaking
discretion. Moreover, the Independent Counsel exercises this power individually,
without having to justify her decision to indict in an opinion or to a higher court, but
only to an easily controlled grand jury. Finally, the Independent Counsel's duties in-
volve an obvious political decision (whether to indict a high executive official) whereas
judges (including Supreme CourtJustices) are, in the great majority of cases, deciding
questions that do not involve politics.
A more glaring exception to the democratic principle that policymaking officials
must be electorally accountable are the heads of independent agencies. The heads of
these agencies are not accountable to the President, because she cannot direct them or
remove them except for cause. Yet, even these officials are subject to more political
control and more checks than the Independent Counsel. First, heads of independent
agencies are appointed by politically accountable officials (the President and the Sen-
ate), whereas independent counsels are selected by judges. Second, independent
agencies tend to be headed by multimember commissions, which function to prevent
aberrant actions, while independent counsels are always individuals. Third, independ-
ent agencies are often required to take actions after notice and comment rulemaking
procedures. Independent counsels, by contrast, make the decision whether to indict
on their own, subject only to the weak check of an easily influenced grand jury.
Fourth, independent agency decisions are often subject to judicial review, but the In-
dependent Counsel's decision to indict is largely unreviewable.
is This danger is compounded by the fact that the Independent Counsel has an
excessive incentive to uncover wrongdoing. See supra note 16 and accompanying text
(discussing the incentives independent counsels have to find wrongdoing).
19 See Samuel Dash, Independent CounseL" No More, No Less a Federal Prosecutor, 86
GEo. LJ. 2077, 2094 (1998).
20 See 28 U.S.C. § 591(a), (a) (1), (c) (1994) (illustrating the Independent Counsel
statute's focus upon the investigation and prosecution of high executive officials for
criminal violations).
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because it both underenforces and overenforces against executive
wrongdoing.
A criminal prosecution model underenforces against executive
misconduct, because it ignores noncriminal misconduct that may jus-
tify dismissing an executive official, such as violations of certain civil
laws and regulations. Moreover, even if an executive official does not
violate a law, her actions may transgress norms of conduct important
enough that their violation would justify discharging her. This princi-
ple is clearly affirmed by the Constitution's authorization for Congress
to impeach executive officials for "high Crimes and Misdemeanors,"
which need not constitute violations of criminal or civil law.
Even when executive officials have committed crimes, criminal
prosecutions still may be an inadequate means of holding them ac-
countable. Criminal prosecutions require that the government prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a proceeding in which the defen-
dant enjoys many significant procedural protections.2 Thus, an ex-
ecutive official may be acquitted in a criminal trial even though there
is strong evidence that she engaged in wrongdoing clearly warranting
her dismissal from office.
In addition to underenforcing against executive misconduct, a
criminal prosecution model suffers from overenforcement. In many
situations, executive wrongdoing should merely result in removal.
Even if an official has arguably committed a crime, the reputational
damage caused by dismissal for wrongdoing often will sufficiently
sanction the official and therefore the prosecutor should exercise her
discretion not to indict. Because the Independent Counsel statute
does not provide an alternative mechanism for disciplining executive
officials, however, independent counsels will often feel compelled to
indict officials who remain in office for fear that their decision not to
indict will be interpreted as an exoneration.
Finally, the Independent Counsel statute places an enormous
burden on executive officials and therefore on the executive branch.
21 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
See MICHAEL J. GEmARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEAcHMENT PROCEss 103 (1996)
("The major disagreement is not over whether impeachable offenses should be strictly
limited to indictable crimes, but rather over the range of nonindictable offenses on
which an impeachment may be based.").
The strict procedural requirements of criminal trials are appropriate for a proc-
ess that results in imprisonment. Holding executive officials accountable, however,
generally does not require that they be imprisoned; rather, it only requires that their
wrongdoing be publicly disclosed and that they be dismissed from office. These lesser
sanctions do not necessitate the strict procedures of criminal trials.
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The appointment of an Independent Counsel, which is usually dis-
closed to the public, damages the reputation of the administration as
well as the official who is the subject of the investigation. The process
of being investigated for a criminal violation also places the official at
risk of imprisonment and therefore tends to distract her from per-
forming her duties. Moreover, as very little evidence is necessary to
trigger the appointment of an Independent Counsel,24 most admini-
strations are likely to be subject to several independent counsel inves-
tigations.2 Because independent counsel investigations are so harm-
ful and so easy to trigger, it is not surprising that they have become a
political weapon for opponents of an administration.
In sum, the Independent Counsel statute has been a disaster. It
has imposed enormous costs through an excessive number of overly
intrusive investigations. Despite these costs, the statute has produced
small benefits, in part because Independent Counsel investigations
have often been regarded as unfair or not credible. A statute de-
signed to promote accountability and confidence in government has
instead resulted in suspicion and cynicism about government officials
and independent counsels. In the end, the many problems with the
Independent Counsel statute all derive from one source: the flawed
vision that informs the statute-a vision that places overriding impor-
tance on the need for independent criminal investigations of execu-
tive wrongdoing and is therefore willing to sacrifice other legitimate
values to that singular goal.
B. Problems with Other Forms of Executive Branch Investigations
The problems with the Independent Counsel statute have led to
many proposed reforms, virtually all of which would rely on investiga-
tions by the executive branch. One type of reform would retain the
concept of an independent investigator within the executive branch,
but would attempt to address some of the defects of the Independent
26Counsel statute. In some plans, this independent investigator would
24 See28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1)(A) (1994).
See Donald C. Smaltz, The Independent Counse" A View from Inside, 86 GEO. L.J.
2307, 2323-24 (1998) (providing a table showing that recent administrations have each
been subject to several independent counsel investigations).
26 See Ken Gormley, An Original Model of the Independent Counsel Statute, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 601, 606 (1998) (arguing that the Independent Counsel statute is "worth saving-
but in a dramatically overhauled form designed to return the statute to its original
purpose").
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head a permanent office within the executive branch.2' A second type
of reform would establish a counsel that would be subject (in theory at
least) to presidential control. Some versions of this proposal would
rely on the traditional system, which allows the Attorney General to
appoint an ad hoc special counsel at her discretion,28 while other ver-
sions propose a permanent office to be headed by an official subject
to presidential direction.2
Given how poorly the Independent Counsel statute has func-
tioned, it is likely that most of these proposals would improve upon it.
Nonetheless, all proposals that rely on executive branch investigations
have serious defects. Proposals that deprive the President of the
power to direct the investigations are unconstitutional and, in most
cases, employ the criminal prosecution model, rely on politically un-
accountable counsels, and excessively burden the executive branch.
Proposals that allow the President to direct the investigations, while
constitutional, have other costs. Under the ad hoc counsel version of
these proposals, executive misconduct would often not be investi-
gated, because a counsel would be appointed only for the rare scandal
that causes the administration great political damage. Ad hoc coun-
sels would also have an incentive to find wrongdoing, because they
generally investigate one principal individual. Under the permanent
official version of the proposals, the main problem is that the counsel
27 See Neil Kinkopf, The Case for a Permanent Independent Counse WALL ST. J., Mar.
30, 1999, at A26 ("Congress should consider creating a permanent, independent of-
fice.., insulated from outside political pressures and armed with jurisdiction to inves-
tigate and prosecute allegations of wrongdoing by high-ranking officials.").
28 See KATYJ. HARRIGER, INDEPENDENTJUSTICE: THE FEDERAL SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
IN AMERICAN PoLrTcs 13-39 (1992) (discussing the historical use of ad hoc special
counsels).
See TERRY EASTLAND, ETHICS, POITICS AND THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL:
EXECUrIVE PowER, ExEcUTIvE VICE 1789-1989, at 130-31 (proposing Office of Special
Counsel, headed by an individual appointed by the President with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate and removable at the sole discretion of the President); Archibald
Cox & Philip B. Heymann, After the Counsel Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1999, at A19
(proposing to assign the investigation and prosecution of criminal charges against
high executive officials to the Justice Department's Criminal Division); see also Thomas
W. Merrill, Beyond the Independent Counsek Evaluating the Options, 43 ST. LOUIS U. LJ.
1047, 1079-80 (proposing an office of career prosecutors, the head of which might be
removable by the President).
so The President will generally not want to appoint an independent investigator
who could uncover harmful information and require the administration to respond to
an investigation. The President will thus only make the appointment when the politi-
cal damage from not appointing an independent investigator is greater than the harm
caused by appointing one. This situation will occur only when there is a significant
political scandal.
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would be investigating the administration that appointed her, that can
remove her, and in which she serves. Moreover, both the ad hoc and
permanent counsel proposals generally employ the criminal prosecu-
tion model.
What is needed is a new approach to investigating executive
branch officials-an approach that is constitutional, employs account-
able officials who are independent of the President, does not rely on
criminal prosecutions, and does not excessively burden the executive
branch. The next Part describes such an approach.
II. CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS
Instead of relying on the executive branch to police itself, Con-
gress should investigate wrongdoing by high executive officials. Sig-
nificantly, the Framers of the Constitution gave the task of investigat-
ing executive branch misconduct to the legislature. Consequently,
establishing an effective institutional arrangement for congressional
investigations does not, in contrast to the Independent Counsel stat-
ute, require that one bend or break the Constitution.
In this Part, I propose a system for congressional investigations of
executive misconduct. First, I briefly discuss the nature and history of
the congressional investigation power. Then, I describe the congres-
sional investigation proposal in general terms. Finally, I explore
changes in congressional procedures that would be needed to estab-
lish fair and effective investigations.
A. Congressional Investigations: A Brief Introduction
The Constitution authorizes Congress to investigate the executive
branch for two principal purposes. First, pursuant to its impeachment
power, the House of Representatives may investigate an executive offi-
cial to determine whether she should be impeached. 1 This power can
only be exercised by the House, because the Senate's power to try im-
peachment cases arises only after the House has actually impeached
an official. 2 Second, either house may use its oversight power to col-
lect information to help it determine whether to pass a new law. This
power allows the houses to probe wrongdoing by executive officials,
S1 See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 ("The House of Representatives ... shall have the
sole Power of Impeachment.").
32 See id. § 3, cl. 6 ("The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeach-
ments.").
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because the information they uncover may help the houses decide
whether new laws to prevent such misconduct are needed 3
The houses generally conduct investigations through committees,
each of which is assisted by a staff. When a committee intends to re-
quire a witness to testify, it will often issue a subpoena.34 If the witness
refuses to comply with the subpoena, the committee can then attempt
to persuade the entire house to enforce it in one of various ways.35
Congressional investigations date back to George Washington's
administration. The House of Representatives conducted the first
significant investigation in 1792 when it inquired into a military deba-
cle commanded by General St. Clair. In this century, Congress has
conducted many important investigations, such as the inquiries into
communist subversion during the McCarthy era, Watergate, and Iran-
Contra. During the Clinton presidency, Congress has examined the
administration numerous times, including investigations into White-
water,3 the Travel Office dismissals,39 the FBI files, 0 campaign finance•• • 41 • 42 4
improprieties, Chinese espionage, and the Lewinsky matter.43
Like other governmental institutions, congressional investigations
33 See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 177-78 (1927) (upholding a Senate in-
vestigation into alleged wrongdoing by the Attorney General, finding that "the subject
was one on which legislation could be had"); 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.
NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8.1 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing McGrain
and the investigatory power of Congress).
34 See JOHN C. GRABOw, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE
§§ 3.1-.2 (1988) (discussing Congress's general powers of investigation and its author-
ity to issue subpoenas).
35 See infra Part II.E.1 (discussing methods of enforcing congressional subpoenas).
See DAVID P. CURRIE, TIM CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD
1789-1801, at 163-64 (1997); GRABOW, supra note 34, § 2.2; TELFORD TAYLOR, GRAND
INQUEST: THE STORY OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 17-29 (1955). Currie also
discusses an investigation during the First Congress of Robert Morris's conduct as Su-
perintendent of Finance under the Confederation. SeeCURRIE, supra, at 20-21.
37 SeeGRABOW, supra note 34, §§ 2.4-.6.
38 See David Maraniss, The Hearings End Much as They Began, WASH. POST, June 19,
1996, at Al.
39 See Ann Devroy, Clinton May Assert Executive Privilege, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1995,
atAll.
40 See Neil A. Lewis, Panel Chairman Demands White House Security Records, N.Y. TIMES,
June 25, 1996, at A15.
41 See Eric Schmitt, Senators Endorse Campaign Inquiry with Wider Scope, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 12, 1997, at Al.
42 SeeJohn Bresnahan &Jim VandeHei, Dicks Named Top Democrat on Cox Pane4 GOP
Leadership Plans To Give Select China Committee a $2.5 Million Budget, ROLLCALL, June 11,
1998.
43 See Peter Baker & Juliet Eilperin, Panel Votes on Party Lines for Impeachment Inquiry,
WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 1998, at Al.
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have produced mixed results. At their best, these inquests have un-
covered wrongdoing and led to the resignation or removal of high ex-
ecutive officials. For example, in the Teapot Dome investigation of
the 1920s, the Senate discovered that the Secretary of the Interior had
accepted money in exchange for the lease of government lands-in-
formation that eventually led to the Secretary's conviction for bribery
and rescission of the leases." In its Watergate investigation, the Sen-
ate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, chaired by
Senator Sam Ervin, examined the cover-up of the Watergate burglary.
The investigation first revealed the existence of the White House tape
system and disclosed serious misconduct by the President and his sen-
ior aides, which resulted in the resignation or dismissal of many of
these officials, including (under threat of impeachment) President
Nixon himself."
46Many investigations, however, have not been as successful. In-
deed, I will argue that congressional investigations of executive offi-
cials have often been plagued by excessive partisanship and inade-
quate committee powers. Congress, however, can address these
problems by changing the rules governing its investigations.
B. The Proposal
One or both houses of Congress should establish a small commit-
tee of five to seven members with the sole responsibility of investigat-
ing misconduct by high executive officials.47 The committee would
have both the authority and the duty to inquire into all cases where
there is evidence of wrongdoing relevant to a person's service in high
governmental office. Thus, the committee would investigate not
merely transgressions of criminal law, but also violations of civil laws• • • 48
and important norms of political propriety.
44 See GRABow, supra note 34, § 2.3; TAYLOR, supra note 36, at 56-57.
4See GRABOW, supra note 34, § 2.5. See generallyJAMES HAMILTON, THE POWER TO
PROBE (1976) (providing an in-depth study of congressional investigations, especially
in li ht of the Watergate scandal).
For examples of recent unsuccessful congressional investigations, see sources
cited infra notes 50-51.
47 There are three possible ways of structuring congressional investigations: first,
only one house of Congress could establish a committee; second, each house could
create a separate committee; and third, the houses together could establish a single
joint committee. I discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each arrangement be-
low. See infra Part IV.A.
"In this respect, the congressional investigation proposal follows the constitu-
tional mechanism which allows for impeachment of executive officials for actions that
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Upon receiving evidence of such wrongdoing,9 the committee
would be required to open an investigation. The investigation, how-
ever, would be conducted differently than most other congressional
investigations. First, the committee would delegate a significant por-
tion of the investigative duties to a staff of lawyers headed by a chief
counsel. Second, the committee and the staff would conduct the in-
vestigation largely behind closed doors. In this way, the committee
could uncover evidence without burdening the public and innocent
parties with revelations about alleged misconduct before all the evi-
dence has been assessed and weighed.
After completing its investigation, the committee would issue a
public report explaining whether it believed the official had engaged
in wrongdoing and presenting the evidence supporting its conclusion.
Thus, the report would provide the public with a single document al-
lowing them to assess the strength of the case against (or for) the in-
vestigated official. In addition to issuing the report, the committee
might also choose to hold hearings if it believed that its findings could
be publicized more effectively in that format
The public disclosure of wrongdoing uncovered by the committee
would help the political system hold the executive branch accountable
for misconduct. Communication of this information to the press and
public would damage the reputations of both the official and the ad-
ministration in which she served. Moreover, in the case of an official
at the cabinet level or below, a report detailing serious misconduct
could easily lead the administration to dismiss the official either based
on genuine concern about the wrongdoing or simply to avoid political
embarrassment. If the executive did not remove the official, the
House of Representatives would then have the option of pursuing im-
peachment proceedings.
An investigation of the President, however, would probably work
differently. Even if the committee uncovered evidence of serious
presidential misconduct, the President would be unlikely to resign un-
less she were about to be, or were in the process of being, impeached.
The committee's investigation, however, would still be of significant
value. The investigation and report would be an important prelimi-
nary step towards the House of Representatives' determination of
whether to impeach the President. Further, even if the information
need not constitute crimes. See GERHARDT, supra note 22, at 103 (discussing the possi-
bility of impeachment for nonindictable offenses).
Congress can obtain evidence of wrongdoing by executive officials from numer-
ous sources, including press reports, the executive branch, state governments, and pri-
vate citizens.
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did not result in the impeachment or resignation of the President, it
would still force her to incur a political price for her misconduct.
C. Problems with Existing Congressional Investigations
While congressional investigations have the potential to contrib-
ute significantly to the task of holding the executive branch account-
able for misconduct, unfortunately the existing congressional investi-
gative process is poorly designed to accomplish this task. Two basic
problems inhibit the effectiveness of the existing process. First, con-
gressional investigations often appear to be excessively partisan. In
the last generation, the majority party in Congress has generally dif-
fered from the party in control of the White House. In this situation,
the majority party is often criticized for overly aggressive investigations
of minor matters and improbable accusations, whereas the minority
party is viewed as resisting inquiries of even the most serious and
credible charges.0 In addition, the majority party often portrays the
results of the investigation in the most damaging terms to the admini-
stration, while the minority party frequently minimizes the signifi-
cance of those results.
51
50 See Guy Gugliotta & Susan Schmidt, Congressional Investigations: More Partisan,
Less Powerful WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1997, at A23; Saundra Torry, Up on the Candidate's
Stump, and Taking Shots, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1996, at H7.
See Francis X. Clines, Campaign Panel To End Hearings on Fund Raising, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 1997, at Al; Ed Henry, "Vindication"Is Hope for Thompson in His Report,
ROLL CALL, Nov. 17, 1997, at 1; Amy Keller, Burton Releases Interim Report, Vows To Con-
tinue Probe, ROLL CALL, Oct. 12, 1998, at 15 [hereinafter Keller, Interim Report]; Amy
Keller, Waxman, House Democrats Attack GOP Partisanship, ROLL CALL, Oct. 8, 1998, at 27
[hereinafter Keller, GOP Partisanship].
A recent example of an investigation marred by partisan disputes was the inquiry
into campaign finance violations conducted by Congressman Dan Burton's Govern-
ment Reform and Oversight Committee. The Democrats repeatedly charged that
Chairman Burton conducted an unfair and overreaching investigation. See Jennifer
Bradley, StaffExodusJolts Burton Probe of 1996Fundraising, ROLL CALL, July 3, 1997, at 1;
Keller, COP Partisanship, supra, Keller, Interim Report, supra. The Republicans, in turn,
maintained that the Democrats had obstructed the investigation and had refused to
support the conferral of immunity for several witnesses without sufficient reason. See
Amy Keller, Four Witnesses Get Immunity from Burton Pane ROLL CAUL, June 25, 1998, at
12; George LardnerJr., Burton Panel Sputters as Immunity VoteFails, WASH. POST, May 14,
1998, at A14.
Similar problems arose in the investigation of campaign finance improprieties
chaired by Senator Fred Thompson. The Democrats maintained that the Republicans
sought to investigate only Democratic Party misconduct and criticized the inquiry as
unfair. See David Jackson, Clinton Fund-Raising Inquiry Hits Snags, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, June 12, 1997, at 1A; Robert Schlesinger, Thompson Panel Dems Allege Obstruction
ofJustice, THE HILL, Feb. 18, 1998, at 3. The Republicans responded that the Demo-
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The most serious consequence of this excessive partisanship has
been to reduce the credibility of the information and findings pro-
duced by congressional committees. Because the majority party often
exaggerates the results of its investigations and the minority party fre-
quently criticizes the majority's investigation, maintaining that it re-
vealed little, the public and the press tend to view the information
produced by the investigation with skepticism. Congressional investi-
gations would be far more effective if they were conducted by commit-
tees consisting of members who had reputations for integrity and who
did not often vote on party lines. Indeed, some of the most effective
investigations have involved committees that have suppressed partisan
52disagreements and compromised. For example, the Cox Commit-
tee's investigation into Chinese espionage has been lauded for its
avoidance of partisanship, and its report has consequently been re-
ceived positively in the press.s3
The second problem with congressional investigations is that
committees have often lacked the power to conduct effective investi-
gations. First, congressional committees have sometimes had diffi-
culty enforcing their subpoenas, especially against executive officials.54
There are several existing methods for enforcing congressional sub-
crats had impeded the investigation by insisting that it terminate on a specific date and
thereby allowing witnesses to pursue a strategy of delay. See Helen Dewar, Senate Talks
on Campaign Finance Probe Grow Contentious, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1997, at A4; Thompson
Wants More Time for Probe, ARiz. REPUBuC, Oct. 29, 1997, at A6.
52 The Ervin Committee that investigated the Watergate cover-up, despite political
differences between the members, was often able to reach agreement on fundamental
matters. See, e.g., GRABOW, supra note 34, § 2.5[c] (noting that the Ervin Committee
unanimously rejected the request of the Special Prosecutor to postpone the hearings).
Even the Burton committee became more effective once it sought to compromise. See
A.B. Stoddard, Dems Agree to Immunity Grant in Exchange for Two Changes in Rules, THE
HILL,June 24, 1998, at 1; see also E.J. Dionne,Jr., "A Quiet Civil War,"WASH. POST, Mar.
29, 1994, at A19 (noting that the "reputation for bipartisanship" of Chairman Jim
Leach gave his charges against President Clinton concerning Whitewater "added
credibility").
53 SeeJuliet Eilperin, Hill Unites in Exposing Chinese Espionage, WASH. POST, May 25,
1999, at A4 (praising Congressman Christopher Cox's bipartisan approach in reaching
agreement on damage caused to U.S. security by China's alleged theft of nuclear se-
crets); John Mintz, China Aid Hurt U.S. Security, Panel Says, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1998,
at Al (remarking that the special panel chaired by Cox was a "rare show of bipartisan-
ship").
SeeJohn Bresnahan, Young Threatens Contempt, ROLL CALL, July 26, 1999, at 1;
Amy Keller & Ed Henry, Early Exit, Subpoena Problems Could Hurt Senate Investigation,
ROLL CALL, Sept. 1, 1997, at 1; Amy Keller, Groups Join Together To Fight Senate Subpoe-
nas, ROLL CALL, Sept. 4, 1997, at 26; Keller, Interim Repor supra note 51; Gil Klein,
Thompson Warns Clinton: Stop Stalling That Suggests Cover Up, RICHMOND TIMEs-
DIsPATcH, Oct. 8, 1997, at Al; Edward Walsh, Another Bump in Burton Panel's Road,
WASH. POST, May 13, 1998, atA4.
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poenas, but each has serious problems. s Second, congressional
committees have often lacked the power to authorize their staffs to
question witnesses who are under oath.56 If the staff cannot ask these
questions, then members of the house must do so. Requiring that
members question the witnesses, however, may impede the investiga-
tions because these legislators have many other responsibilities and
may not be able to devote the time necessary to the task .
Interestingly, the two basic problems with existing congressional
investigations-excessive partisanship and the lack of adequate power
for the committees-may be related. In part, Congress and the Presi-
dent may be unwilling to confer significant authority on committees
because they fear that partisans may abuse this authority. Thus, a new
procedure is needed that will reduce the degree of partisanship on in-
vestigative committees and allow these committees to be given more
power.
D. Appointing the Committee
Under existing congressional rules, each party appoints the com-
mittee members from its own party. Thus, the Republicans select the
Republican members of committees and the Democrats choose the
Democratic members. Unfortunately, this appointment method has
often produced investigative committees that are prone to excessive
political partisanship. Congressional investigations of executive
wrongdoing would be more effective if investigative committees were
less partisan. Surprisingly, there is a practical method for selecting
55 See infra Part II.E.1 (discussing the three existing methods for enforcing congres-
sional subpoenas and the problems with these methods); see also infra note 71 and ac-
companying text (discussing a famous example of the executive branch's refusal to
criminally prosecute an agency head for contempt of Congress).
See JAY R. SHAMPANSKY, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, PUB. NO. 91-679A,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERvICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS: STAFF DEPOSITIONS IN
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS (1991).
57 Members may also be less skilled at questioning than the staff would be. By con-
trast, committees that can employ their staff to question witnesses who are under oath
have proven effective. For example, the Iran-Contra inquiry, despite its political prob-
lems, used staff depositions to great effect in investigating a large number of witnesses.
See GRABOw, supra note 34, § 2.6[c], [i]. Indeed, Grabow suggests that the reliance on
staff depositions, rather than closed hearings attended by many members and staff,
may have helped to limit the number of leaks of confidential information to the me-
dia. See id. at 56 n.41.
See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., How CONGRESS WORKS 121, 146-47 (3d
ed. 1998) [hereinafter How CONGRESS WORKS] (describing how the two houses select
members for committees).
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such a committee. Each house should change its rules to allow the
Republicans to choose the Democratic members of the investigative
committee and the Democrats to select the Republican members
5 9
This interparty appointment method would have two principal ef-
fects. First, it would provide each party with an incentive to choose
members of the other party who were political moderates. For exam-
ple, Republicans would prefer the most centrist Democrats, whose po-
litical views are generally the closest to those of Republicans. Second,
each party would have an incentive to select persons from the other
party who have reputations for integrity-that is, for acting based on
the evidence rather than on party solidarity or political considera-
tions. Democrats, for instance, would obviously prefer those Republi-
cans who would judge a Democratic administration based on the facts
rather than on the opportunity to make political points. Although
each party would desire members from the other party who were both
political moderates and had integrity, they would often be forced to
compromise on one characteristic to obtain someone who possessed
the other. Political moderates do not necessarily have the most integ-
rity. Moderates can be quite political, whereas legislators with more
extreme political views are often principled people with tremendous
integrity. Each party would thus choose members from the other
party who scored the most on a scale that measured both characteris-
tics.
Significantly, this interparty appointment process would select for
the committee exactly those members most desirable from a public
policy perspective. First, the committee should be composed of po-
litical moderates. This is not because political moderation is prefer-
able to radicalism, but because the committee will be more effective if
its members have similar views. The committee will then often be able
to act by consensus, and when disagreements do occur, they will tend
to be small. Second, the committee should also be filled with mem-
bers who act based on the evidence rather than on political considera-
tions. Investigations of executive wrongdoing should depend on the
behavior of the officials being investigated, not on their political af-
filiation.
A committee selected by the interparty appointment process
would therefore have many desirable features. Because the commit-
tee would be composed of members who have integrity and often act
59 Under this appointment method, a member selected for the investigative com-
mittee by the other party would be required to serve, subject to the exceptions dis-
cussed below. See infra text preceding note 61.
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by consensus, the committee's reports would tend to have great influ-
ence with the press and the public. Moreover, since it would be com-
posed of political moderates, the committee would be unlikely to take
actions that Congress and the President would regard as extreme and
unwarranted. As a result, Congress and the President might be willing
to provide it with the significant powers it would need in order to be
effective.60
It might be argued, however, that the interparty appointment
method would work differently in practice than in theory. Although
in theory the parties would select political moderates who have integ-
rity, in practice they might pursue other strategies. For example, one
party might choose members of the other party, such as the party
leaders or committee chairs, who had other duties and would thus be
distracted or burdened by serving on the investigatory committee. Al-
ternatively, the party that holds the White House might select mem-
bers from the other party who they believed were prone to incompe-
tent and embarrassing actions, so that their actions and those of the
committee could be ridiculed and dismissed. Finally, the party that
holds the White House might select members from the other party
who have ethical or other problems of their own to make it embarrass-
ing or difficult for them to investigate the administration.
These concerns about the appointment process, however, could
be addressed. First, the problem of a party selecting party leaders or
committee chairs could be eliminated by allowing these members to
refuse to serve. Second, the concern of a party selecting members
who may be ridiculed or who have embarrassing problems could be
addressed by allowing each party to veto a limited number of ap-
pointments made by the other party. For example, if the Senate inves-
tigatory committee were to consist of four Democrats and three Re-
publicans, the Republicans might be required to select eight
Democrats for the committee, with the Democrats permitted to
choose the four members that they preferred. The Republicans could
not then force one or two problematic Democrats on to the commit-
tee. Another check on such strategic behavior is that the party select-
ing the embarrassing members would pay a price for doing so. It is
true that under existing procedures, the minority party has sometimes
believed that ridiculing problematic committee chairs was a good
strategy.6' But under existing procedures the majority party selects
60 See infra Part Ml.E (discussing the additional powers the committee would need to
be effective).
61 See Gugliotta & Schmidt, supra note 50.
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committee chairs, whereas under the interparty appointment proce-
dure, the minority party would do so. Thus, the minority party would
be criticized for attempting to manipulate the system and for selecting
inappropriate candidates. The minority party would also find it diffi-
cult to criticize members whom it chose for the committee.
One final issue concerns the political composition of the commit-
tee. In my view, the proportion of members from each party on the
investigative committee should, as is true generally of committees, re-
flect the proportion of members from each party in the parent house.
Thus, if one party had a slight majority in the parent house, it would
also have a slight majority on the committee. It might be argued,
however, that the premises underlying the interparty appointment
process suggest that the investigatory committee should have an equal
number of members from each party. In this way, the committee's
decisions would not reflect political considerations, but instead the
merits of the investigation. This argument, however, is mistaken be-
cause it assumes that it is possible to eliminate politics from the inves-
tigation of high executive branch officials. That was the premise of
the Independent Counsel statute, but experience has shown that to be
62false. When it comes to the high stakes politics of investigating a
President or cabinet official, political considerations can be reduced
but not eliminated. If the minority party enjoyed equal representa-
tion on the committee it could abuse this power by, for example, re-
sisting investigations or subpoenas of executive officials from its party.
Thus, equal representation on the committee would not eliminate
politics, but would simply rearrange the constellation of political
forces in the investigative process.63
Even if one could eliminate the role of politics, it is not clear that
doing so would be desirable. Politics adds a dimension of responsibil-
ity. When members of the majority party make a decision based on
the party's political views and interests, voters can hold the party re-
sponsible at the polls. This responsibility allows more general princi-
ples and interests to be reflected and judged in the political process.
Well-functioning institutions often do not eliminate political forces,
but merely prevent such forces from having an excessive influence.
62 See sources cited supra note 14.
63 The majority party in Congress is also unlikely to adopt a system with equal rep-
resentation. Even with unequal representation, an interparty appointment process
arguably reduces the power of the majority party. Although I argue below that the
benefits to the majority party from such an appointment process might lead that party
to support it, see infra Part IV.C, equal representation would so significantly reduce the
power of the majority party that it would be very unlikely to adopt it.
REPLA C1NG INDEPENDENT COUNSELS
There is a strong analogy here between the interparty appoint-
ment process and the classical American justifications for a large na-
tional republic and the system of checks and balances. In The Federal-
ist Papers, James Madison discussed two serious problems for
government: factions in the political process and the desire of politi-
cians for power. Significantly, Madison did not seek to solve these
problems by attempting to eliminate their causes directly, but instead
by modifying the structure of government to reduce their harmful ef-
fects. Thus, in The Federalist No. 10, Madison did not try to eradicate
factions, but rather tried to mitigate their malevolent consequences by
forming a large republic.6 Similarly, in The Federalist No. 51, Madison
does not attempt to extinguish the desire for power, but instead to
moderate its dangerous results by making ambition counteract ambi-
tion with checks and balances." The interparty appointment process
likewise does not attempt to eliminate each party's partisan prefer-
ences. Instead, it attempts to lessen their harmful effects by altering
the method of appointment so that the partisan desires of each party
lead it to select the most appropriate members of the opposing party
for the committee.
E. Additional Powers of the Committee
In order to conduct effective investigations, the investigative
committee would also need significant powers. The committee would,
of course, require the ordinary powers possessed by committees, such
as the power to hire a staff, to issue subpoenas, to write reports, and to
grant immunity by a two-thirds vote of the members.6
The investigative committee, however, would also need several
powers that existing committees do not generally enjoy. First, the
committee would require a better method of enforcing subpoenas
against executive officials than committees presently possess. Second,
the committee would need the power to authorize its staff to conduct
significant parts of the investigation, including questioning witnesses
who are under oath. Finally, the committee would need access to ad-
ditional funds for investigations without having to secure approval
from the parent house. In each of these cases, adequate authority
6T-m FEDERAIusTNo. 10 (James Madison).
THE FEDERALiST No. 51 (James Madison).
See 18 U.S.C. § 6005 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (conferring power on committees
to grant immunity); GRABOW, supra note 34, §§ 3.1-3.6 (describing the tools of inquiry
available to Congress in conducting investigations).
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could be provided to the committee.
1. The Power To Enforce Subpoenas
The investigative committee must have the power to effectively en-
force its subpoenas. Without this authority, the committee's requests
for testimony and documents could be ignored without legal conse-
quences. There are currently three ways to enforce legislative sub-
poenas, but none of them is adequate for investigations of executive
misconduct.
First, each house of Congress has the inherent authority to arrest
and try someone for contempt if she fails to comply with a lawful sub-
poena. A contemptuous witness can be imprisoned, but only through
the duration of the pending session of Congress.67 The main problem
with this procedure is that it requires a house to hold a time-
consuming trial. As a result, Congress has not invoked its inherent
power since the 1930s, relying instead on other methods.
Second, contemptuous witnesses may be prosecuted for criminal
contempt. Congress has enacted a statute making it a misdemeanor
for a witness to willfully refuse to answer a question.& There are, how-
ever, problems with using this procedure to require testimony from
executive branch officials. First, the procedures require a U.S. Attor-
ney to prosecute the criminal contempt, but U.S. Attorneys serve at
the pleasure of the President.69 Thus, they may be reluctant to prose-
cute contempt charges against officials in the administration in which
they serve. 0 Second, the criminal character of the contempt might
also give the U.S. Attorney an excuse to forego prosecution. Because
it is often difficult to prevail in a criminal prosecution, the U.S. Attor-
ney could argue that it is not worth devoting resources to prosecution.
Because the contempt carries a criminal sanction, the U.S. Attorney
might also argue that prosecuting the case would be excessive, espe-
cially if the official's refusal to answer was based on a presidential as-
67 See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1821); GRABoW, supra note
34, t3.4[a] (describing Congress's self-help contempt power).
See2 U.S.C. § 192 (1994).
See 28 U.S.C. § 541 (1994).
70 U.S. Attorneys probably are more likely to bring these actions than to investigate
executive wrongdoing from scratch. When the U.S. Attorney receives a referral for
criminal contempt, it is hard for her to claim there is no factual basis for not prosecut-
ing, because the facts have already been developed. By contrast, if a U.S. Attorney
were asked to investigate an executive official, she could fail to develop the facts and
claim there was little evidence of wrongdoing. Nonetheless, U.S. Attorneys still cannot
be relied upon to prosecute the criminal contempt case with full vigor.
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sertion of executive privilege. The difficulties of using a prosecution
for criminal contempt to enforce subpoenas are illustrated by the case
of Ann Gorsuch Burford, Administrator of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency during the Reagan Administration. After the Democrat-
controlled House of Representatives found her in criminal contempt
for refusing to provide documents which had been the subject of an
executive privilege claim, the U.S. Attorney refused to prosecute.7'
These problems have led Congress to adopt a third method for
enforcing subpoenas. In 1978, Congress passed statutory authority al-
lowing the Senate to bring civil actions to enforce its subpoenas in
federal court. Under this statute, the entire Senate must authorize
the action, which will normally be brought by the Senate legal coun-
sel.7 If the federal court determines that the subpoena was legal and
no defenses were available against it, the court must enforce the sub-
poena without exercising any discretion as to whether it was appropri-
ate for the Senate to issue the subpoena.73 If the witness refuses to
obey the court's order, then the court would hold her in contempt
until she complies.
This civil enforcement scheme avoids many of the problems of the
criminal contempt mechanism. Because it provides a civil remedy, the
Senate need not prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt as it would
in a criminal trial. The Senate can also bring the action itself rather
than having to rely on the executive branch.
Although this civil enforcement scheme has significantly improved
the legislature's ability to enforce committee subpoenas, several fea-
tures of existing law would need to change in order to provide the in-
vestigative committee with adequate authority. First, because only the
Senate presently possesses civil enforcement authority, legislation
would be required to confer it on the House as well. Second, the Sen-
ate's authority does not allow a committee to independently enforce
the subpoena, but instead requires the entire Senate to approve the
71 See GRABOW, supra note 34, § 3.4[b] [5] (describing the inability of the House of
Representatives to secure Gorsuch Burford's contempt prosecution in 1982). See gen-
erally Todd D. Peterson, Prosecuting Executive Branch Officials for Contempt of Congress, 66
N.Y.U. L. REV. 563, 625-31 (1991) (discussing criminal sanctions for contempt of Con-
gress in light of the incident involving Gorsuch Burford).
72 See 2 U.S.C. § 288d(a) (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1365(a)-(b) (1994); see alsojames
Hamilton & John C. Grabow, A Legislative Proposal for Resolving Executive Privilege Dis-
putes Precipitated by Congressional Subpoenas, 21 HARV.J. ON LEGIs. 145, 150 (1984).
See In re Application of the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations
(Cammisano), 655 F.2d 1232, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Senate Select Comm. on Ethics v.
Packwood, 845 F. Supp. 17, 20-21 (D.D.C. 1994).
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action. 4 This would be a drawback because the investigative commit-
tee would be specially appointed so that it would behave differently
than the parent house. If the committee must secure the approval of
the entire house, the house might place unreasonable conditions on
its approval that would interfere with the investigation. Thus, the
committee should have independent authority to enforce its sub-
poena.75 Finally, the Senate's authority to enforce subpoenas does not
extend to subpoenas against executive officials. 6 Clearly, in order to
use the authority to investigate executive misconduct, it would need to
cover executive officials. This would allow the committee to question
the target of the investigation and her co-workers.
To ensure that the committee has adequate authority, Congress
should therefore pass a law allowing a specially appointed investigative
committee from either house to enforce its subpoenas against execu-
tive officials. Such a law might engender two possible objections.
First, some commentators have argued that Congress should not be
allowed to bring civil suits against executive officials to enforce sub-
poenas. They contend that interbranch disputes over information re-
quests should be resolved through informal negotiation between the
branches rather than through adjudication by the courts.7 7 Under this
view, negotiation will result in a resolution that is more sensitive to the
needs of the branches while appropriately limiting the power of the
courts in an interbranch dispute. If we assume for purposes of argu-
ment that the adjudication of interbranch information disputes is un-
desirable, then allowing Congress to bring civil enforcement suits
against executive officials would be a cost of the congressional investi-
gation proposal. Nonetheless, there is a way to minimize these costs.
The authority to enforce subpoenas against executive officials should
be reserved for the specially appointed committee that only has the
power to investigate high executive officials for wrongdoing. This
limitation would prevent Congress from using the authority merely for
74 SeeGRABOw, supra note 34, § 3.4[c] n.86.
75 Clearly, there is no constitutional problem with transferring the power to seek
judicial enforcement of subpoenas from the entire house to the committee. Individual
committees can exercise many significant powers, including the power to issue sub-
poenas and the power to grant immunity to a witness. See id. §§ 3.2[a]-[c], 3.6. These
powers are no less significant than the power to seek judicial enforcement of subpoe-
nas.
76 See 28 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (Supp. V 1999).
77 See Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest Pro-
posal-Do Nothing 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 114-16 (1996); Peterson, supra note 71, at
625-31.
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oversight purposes and would only bestow the authority upon a com-
mittee appointed by a method designed to prevent it from being con-
trolled by partisans. Thus, the authority could be used only in limited
circumstances-when a moderate committee concluded it was neces-
sary for investigating executive branch wrongdoing-and therefore
when the benefits were likely to exceed the costs.
The second objection questions the constitutionality of congres-
sional lawsuits to enforce subpoenas. It might be argued that bringing
a lawsuit to enforce a government subpoena is executive power and
therefore cannot be exercised by the legislature. The power of a
congressional committee to seek judicial enforcement of a subpoena,
however, is also legislative power. Such power, I will argue, is part of
the legislative authority of the two houses over impeachments and
oversight.7 9
In examining the constitutionality of a committee's power to seek
judicial enforcement of subpoenas, it is essential to view this power in
conjunction with the traditional power of a legislative house to punish
contempts. Because these two powers are similar, our analysis of one
will affect how we analyze the other.
The traditional power of the houses to punish contempts allows
each house to imprison individuals who engaged in contemptuous
behavior, such as refusing to comply with a subpoena or other binding
requests for testimony.0 In exercising this power, the house would ad-
judicate whether the individual had committed the contempt. If the
individual were found guilty, she was imprisoned in the Capitol itself
or in the Washington, D.C.jail.
The Supreme Court held this inherent power to punish con-
tempts to be constitutional in a series of cases beginning with Anderson
v. Dunn in 1821.8' These cases provide two strong reasons for con-
cluding that the Constitution permits legislative houses to imprison
78 If a committee lawsuit to enforce a legislative subpoena were executive power,
the existing Senate authority, which does not extend to executive officials, would also
be unconstitutional. The question of whether the enforcement of a subpoena is ex-
ecutive power does not turn on the object of its enforcement.
See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (discussing how Congress's investi-
gative authority is derived from its impeachment and oversight powers).
80 See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
81 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821); Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 149-52
(1935); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927) ("We are of the opinion that
the power of inquiry-with the process to enforce it-is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative functions."); Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 542-46
(1917) (confirming an implied power of Congress to punish for contempt).
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witnesses who do not comply with subpoenas.8 First, traditionally An-
glo-American legislatures, including the House of Commons, the co-
lonial legislatures, many of the state houses prior to and after the rati-
fication of the Constitution, and early Congresses had the power to
punish contempts.s Moreover, in several of the state constitutions,
this power was not conferred through an explicit provision. Instead,
the power was deemed an inherent attribute of legislative houses and
was apparently implied from the provision establishing the house.
This history suggests that the Framers and Ratifiers of the U.S. Consti-
tution believed that the legislative houses possessed this power without
any explicit provision conferring it.
Second, constitutional structure and purpose support an interpre-
tation that would allow the houses to punish individuals who violate
their subpoenas. Without this power, the houses would have to rely
on executive branch prosecutions for enforcement of their subpoe-
nas. This reliance, however, would render the impeachment and
82 Traditionally, legislatures could punish actions other than failing to comply with
a lawful subpoena as contempts. Other examples of contempts included attempts to
bribe members, libels and slanders of members, and interferences with legislative privi-
leges. See C.S. Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies To Punish for Contempt, 74 U. PA. L. REV.
691, 692-99, 707-12, 715-18, 719-25 (1926). In this Section, I only defend Congress's
power to punish contempts that involve the violation of lawful subpoenas. Other con-
tempts may raise additional issues (such as whether they are consistent with other con-
stitutional provisions like the First Amendment). Cf Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521,
542 (1917) (reading the contempt power narrowly to forbid the House from punishing
an individual who slandered the House but presented no immediate obstruction to the
legislative process).
SeeJames M. Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investi-
gation, 40 HARv. L. REv. 153, 165-68 (1926); Potts, supra note 82, at 692-99, 708-12, 715-
18, 719-25. Although many of the examples relied upon by these commentators to
show that the legislative houses had the power to punish contempts involved the fail-
ure to provide evidence to a committee, some examples involved other types of con-
tempts as well. See supra note 82 (describing other types of contempts). While I am
here concerned with a house's power to punish individuals who fail to comply with
subpoenas, evidence of punishment for other contempts supports a house's authority
to punish for subpoena violations.
84 SeePotts, supra note 82, at 715.
85 My conclusion that the individual houses have the power to seek judicial en-
forcement of their subpoenas might seem inconsistentwith the claim that if the houses
did not have the power to punish contempts, they would have to rely on the executive
branch to enforce their subpoenas. This is not so. My argument that the houses have
the power to seek judicial enforcement relies on the power of the houses to punish
contempts. Thus, if the houses did not have the power to punish contempts, they
would not have power to seekjudicial enforcement of their subpoenas either.
One could, of course, imagine a different argument for the power to seek judicial
enforcement that does not rely on the power to punish contempts. If one accepted
this argument, then one could not also claim that the power to prosecute contempts
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oversight powers far less effective because the executive branch might
be reluctant to aid congressional investigations of itself. The Framers
placed great importance on the system of checks and balances. It is
unlikely that they would have created a check on the executive that
required the executive's active cooperation for its enforcement. In-
deed, the Framers designed the impeachment power to be used
against a tyrannical president unwilling to assist in her own removal.86
Thus, strong evidence would be needed before one concluded that
the Framers deprived Congress of the power to enforce legislative
subpoenas.
Once one determines that the houses possess the power to punish
contempts, it is a short step to concluding that they also have the
authority to seek judicial enforcement of their subpoenas. This is be-
cause the power to seek judicial enforcement is merely one compo-
nent of the power to punish contempts. The power to punish con-
tempts includes the power to decide to prosecute someone for
committing a contempt; to adjudicate whether she committed the
contempt; and then to imprison her. By contrast, the power to seek
judicial enforcement of a subpoena is no broader than one of these
powers alone: the power to prosecute.8' The remainder of Congress's
power to punish contempts is either placed in the other branches
(with adjudications in the courts and imprisonment by the executive)
or not exercised at all (because Congress does not attempt to impose
a criminal sanction for failure to obey a subpoena). Thus, if Con-
gress's power to punish for contempts is legislative power, then cer-
tainly its exercise of a portion of this power for a similar purpose
should also be deemed legislative power.
In addition to being narrower than the power to punish con-
tempts, the power to seek judicial enforcement of subpoenas also bet-
ter comports with principles embedded in the Constitution and held
by the Framers. First, the power to seek judicial enforcement respects
separation of powers and due process principles far more than does
the power to punish contempts. When a house exercises the power to
punish contempts, it combines two otherwise separate powers: prose-
helped prevent Congress from relying exclusively on the executive branch for en-
forcement.
See general1y THE FEDERALISTNOs. 65, 77 (Alexander Hamilton).
87 Actually, the power to seek judicial enforcement is narrower than the power to
prosecute a contempt. When Congress pursues judicial enforcement, it enforces the
subpoena by asking a court to order the subject of the subpoena to comply. When
Congress prosecutes a contempt, it enforces the subpoena by imprisoning the individ-
ual.
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cution and adjudication. It also conflicts with the fundamental due
process principle, embraced by the Framers, that no entity, including
Congress, should judge its own case.e Second, the power to seek judi-
cial enforcement better conforms to constitutional checks and bal-
ances. Although this power allows the legislative houses to check the
executive by enforcing subpoenas against executive officials, it is less
likely to create an unbalanced constitution where Congress can im-
prison executive officials solely on its own determination that they
have violated legislative subpoenas. Third, the power to seek judicial
enforcement uses a more modest sanction-a court order rather than
imprisonment-to enforce subpoenas than does the power to punish
contempts. Consequently, the power to seek judicial enforcement
furthers the Framers' preferences for less intrusive government
authority." It is also less likely to provoke executive retaliation and
degenerate into the type of full-blown factional conflict that the
Framers so feared.90
Thus, I conclude that a house's power to seek judicial enforce-
ment of a legislative subpoena is legislative power and therefore con-
stitutional.91 This power is narrower than the power to punish con-
88 SeeTHIEFEDERALiST No. 10, at 79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Due process concerns are especially heightened because contempts are punishable by
imprisonment.
Another factor supporting the constitutionality of the legislative power to seek
judicial enforcement of subpoenas is that it does not involve criminal prosecution. If
the houses were attempting to bring criminal prosecutions in court, this would be ex-
tremely problematic. Criminal prosecution in the courts is an inherently executive
function. By contrast, the authority to seek judicial enforcement of a subpoena is
regularly exercised by private parties in lawsuits. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 45. Although the
power to punish contempts does allow the houses to imprison individuals, that power
is historically distinct from the power to criminally prosecute in federal court and in-
corporates additional limits, such as the prohibition on imprisoning an individual be-
yond the duration of the pending session. See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
204, 231 (1821).
90 On the Framers' fear of factions, see, for example, THE EDERALIST No. 10
(James Madison).
91 It might be thought that even if the power to seek judicial enforcement of a
subpoena is legislative power, this authority, like other forms of legislative power, must
be exercised in accordance with bicameralism and presentment. See INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 956-59 (1983) (finding the one-house legislative veto unconstitutional as
a violation of bicameralism and presentment). The Constitution, however, clearly con-
templates that the individual houses can exercise certain legislative powers, two of
which are impeachment and oversight. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (providing the
House with the sole power to impeach); id. § 3, cl. 6 (providing the Senate with the
sole power to try impeachments); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 137 (1927)
("Each House of Congress has power to conduct an investigation in aid of its legislative
functions."). Thus, individual houses may enforce subpoenas in furtherance of these
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tempts and is more in accord with principles embedded in the Consti-
tution. 2
2. The Authority To Empower the Staff To Conduct Investigations
In order to conduct effective investigations, the proposed investi-
gatory committee would also need to be able to delegate more author-
ity to its staff than does the ordinary congressional committee. Dele-
gation to the staff of a significant part of the investigative work would
serve several purposes. It would avoid placing significant burdens on
the committee members, who have many other legislative responsibili-
ties. Moreover, because committee members would not be burdened
by investigations, the committee could authorize as many investiga-
tions as necessary and pursue them as intensively as warranted. The
committee could also conduct more effective investigations because
the staff would have expertise and experience that many members
lack.
93
Although it would do a significant part of the investigating, the
staff would remain subordinate to the committee members. Impor-
tant policy decisions would always be made by the committee as a
whole. In particular, only the committee would open investigations,
grant immunity, issue subpoenas, and rule on objections raised by
powers.
92 Some readers might be skeptical about the existence of Congress's power to
punish contempts relating to its oversight power, because the oversight power is not
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. In this Essay, I have assumed, based on Su-
preme Court precedent, that the oversight power is constitutional. But even if Con-
gress did not possess the oversight power, one could persuasively argue that the houses
would still have the power to punish contempts when acting under their constitution-
ally explicit impeachment powers. Indeed, the Supreme Court's decision in Ki/boum v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881), although extremely skeptical about a general legislative
power to punish contempts, admitted that the houses had this power when exercising
their impeachment authority.
Furthermore, even if one believed there was no congressional power to punish
contempts, including those relating to impeachments, this would not necessarily mean
that the houses lacked the power to seek judicial enforcement of subpoenas. If the
houses had no power to punish contempts, they would need the power to seekjudicial
enforcement of subpoenas all the more, or else they would be forced to rely on the
executive branch's willingness to enforce subpoenas against itself.
93 If the staff is to exercise significant authority, it should be headed by someone
who is both competent and trustworthy. The head of staff or chief counsel would su-
pervise the day-to-day operations of the investigations and report to the committee
members. To ensure that the person chosen for chief counsel had the confidence of
the entire committee, she should probably be appointed by a supermajority vote of the
committee. To ensure that the chief counsel is accountable to the committee, how-
ever, she should be removable by a simple majority.
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witnesses. In this way, only electorally accountable officials would
make the important policy decisions.
The most important power that the committee would need to
delegate is the authority to question witnesses who are under oath.
Without this authority, committee members would have the burden-
some task of posing all the questions. The problem, however, is that
existing legislative rules often forbid committees from delegating this
power to their staffs. Instead, committees must first obtain the ap-
proval of the parent house before granting questioning authority to
staff members.94 Under this arrangement, the investigative committee
might have to regularly employ its political capital to secure the
authority it would need. Moreover, the parent house might attempt
to use its power to withhold approval to impose conditions on the
committee's investigations.
There are good reasons why the parent houses often require
committees to receive approval before allowing their staffs to question
witnesses who are under oath. Certain committees have used their
powers very aggressively. Requiring the committee members to ask
the questions themselves limits the committee's ability to use and
abuse its powers. Congress, however, should be far less hesitant to
delegate this authority to the investigating committee, which is spe-
cially appointed and therefore unlikely to abuse its authority.95
One question is whether it is constitutional for the staff to ques-
tion witnesses who are under oath. Congress appears to believe it is
constitutional, because both houses sometimes allow committees to
delegate this authority to their staffs." The Constitution, however,
clearly places some limits on how much authority legislative staff can
exercise, since it vests legislative power in the two houses of Congress
and states that each house consists of its members.97 Although the
94 See GRABOW, supra note 34, § 3.3 (discussing the use of staff depositions to obtain
sworn wimess testimony); MORTON ROSENBERG, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, PUB. No. 95-
464A, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS: INVESTIGATING
OVERsIGHT: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF
CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY (1995).
95 In addition to allowing the investigative committee to delegate the power to
question witnesses to its staff, Congress would also need to adjust related statutes-
such as those governing criminal contempt, perjury, obstruction ofjustice, and other
similar matters-to clarify that they apply when the staff questions witnesses who are
under oath. See SHAMPANSiKY, supra note 56, at 8-15 (discussing the application of
perjury and contempt statutes to false statements made in response to staff questions).
See supra note 94 (citing sources that discuss staff investigations).
97 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting all legislative powers in Congress); id. § 2, cl. 1
(providing that the House of Representatives "shall be composed of Members"); id.
REPLA CING INDEPENDENT COUNSELS
precise limits on how much power can be delegated are uncertain in
this undeveloped area of constitutional law, certain points seem clear.
On the one hand, a member cannot delegate to her staff central and
important powers, such as her right to vote on bills or on matters such
as impeachment.98 On the other hand, a member may authorize her
staff to undertake significant tasks, such as researching and writing
proposed legislation, so long as the member introduces the bill her-
self.
Despite the uncertainties in this area of constitutional law, the fol-
lowing division of labor between committee and staff appear to be
clearly constitutional. The committee would determine which wit-
nesses to depose and the general areas in which they would be exam-
ined. The staff would then depose the witnesses, deciding which par-
ticular questions within the area specified by the committee to ask. If
a witness objected to a question from the staff, a member of the com-
mittee would then rule upon the objection. To enable members to
rule without requiring that they incur the burden of attending the
deposition, the members could be contacted by telephone or fax.
This arrangement would fall well within constitutional limits be-
cause the staff would not exercise discretion on significant policy mat-
ters. Rather, staff members could only ask questions within the gen-
eral area specified by the committee. Moreover, a witness would be
obliged to answer a question only if she did not object to it or a com-
mittee member ruled against the objection."
3. Providing Adequate Resources to the Committee
Finally, the committee would need adequate resources to fund its
§ 3, cl. 1 (providing that the Senate "shall be composed of two Senators from each
State").
98 SeeJohn 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Rights of Legislators and the
Wrongs of Interpretation: A Further Defense of the Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority
Rules, 47 DUKE L.J. 327, 331-35 (1997).
99 It might be argued that this arrangement would unduly burden committee
members by requiring one of them to be available by telephone or fax when deposi-
tions are being taken. Because committee members could share the responsibilities,
one might doubt that this arrangement would in fact be burdensome. If it were, how-
ever, alternative procedures could be employed. For example, the committee could
require witnesses to answer questions asked by staff members, even if the witness has
an objection (except in cases of self-incrimination, which raise additional concerns).
The witness's answer, however, could not be used until a member of the committee
ruled against the objection. This arrangement would still appear to be constitutional,
because the witness's answer could not be used until a member of the committee had
ruled.
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investigations. Unfortunately, Congress could not determine in ad-
vance how much money the committee would need for a given year
due to the difficulty of predicting how many investigations would be
required. This creates a dilemma. On the one hand, if Congress pro-
vides a small appropriation, the committee might need to secure addi-
tional funds from the parent house, which could then use its leverage
to interfere with the committee's investigations. On the other hand, if
the committee receives a large appropriation, it might be tempted to
use the funds to investigate people even if the investigations were not
warranted.
Congress could avoid this dilemma between conferring inade-
quate and excessive funds by providing the committee with a small
appropriation along with the authority to access additional moneys if
necessary. To secure the additional funds, the committee might be
required to submit a written finding, to be sent to the parent house,
explaining why they are needed. To ensure that the finding was not
made too easily, a supermajority of the committee members might be
required to support it. In this way, the committee could be given lim-
ited resources while retaining the ability to secure additional funds if
circumstances required it.
III. BENEFITS OF THE PROPOSAL
As a means of monitoring and disciplining executive misconduct,
the congressional investigation proposal is superior to the Independ-
ent Counsel statute and to other types of investigations by the execu-
tive branch. Indeed, the congressional investigation proposal avoids
each of the significant defects of the Independent Counsel statute.
The proposal is constitutional, politically accountable, fair, and does
not excessively burden the executive branch or employ a criminal
prosecution model. Although not perfect, it is the best of the avail-
able alternatives.
First, the congressional investigation proposal conforms to the let-
ter and spirit of the Constitution. The procedure relies upon clearly
established constitutional powers of impeachment and oversight.
Therefore, unlike the Independent Counsel statute and other types of
independent executive branch investigations, the proposal need not
infringe on the President's power to appoint or control executive offi-
cials in order to establish an effective investigative arrangement.
Second, the proposal employs officials who are both electorally
accountable and independent of presidential control. The committee
members would have to stand for election. Although the committee
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staff would not face the voters, the committee members would make
the important policy decisions. The committee also would be entirely
insulated from presidential control, since the members would not take
orders from the President and would be part of a separate branch. By
contrast, investigations by executive officials cannot be both inde-
pendent and accountable: either the officials are independent of the
President but not electorally accountable, or they are electorally ac-
countable but subject to presidential control.
Third, the proposal establishes an investigative system that would
operate fairly and reasonably. The interparty appointment process
would ensure that the committee members would tend to have integ-
rity and be moderate.00 Further, because the committee would inves-
tigate all executive officials who might have committed misconduct,
not just one person, it would not have an incentive to find wrongdo-
ing where none exists.
Fourth, the proposal avoids the problems caused by using criminal
prosecutions to monitor and discipline executive officials. Congres-
sional investigations would explore all significant wrongdoing, not
simply criminal behavior, and they would not burden investigators
with having to prove the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt in a
criminal proceeding where the defendant enjoys significant privileges.
Moreover, congressional investigations would not require that an offi-
cial be criminally prosecuted and possibly imprisoned to ensure that
she was held accountable for her actions.
Finally, the proposal does not excessively burden the executive
branch and is unlikely to be used as a political weapon. Congressional
investigations would not create a risk that the investigated official
would be imprisoned or even suggest that she had committed a crime.
Rather, such investigations would mainly serve to uncover information
about misconduct and release it to the public. Moreover, congres-
sional investigations would not, as mentioned above, provide the
committee with an incentive to find that the investigated official had
engaged in misconduct. Consequently, the burdens that congres-
sional investigations impose on executive officials and the executive
branch would be much smaller than those imposed by independent
counsel investigations.
100 That the committee members are electorally accountable also suggests that they
would behave reasonably.
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IV. OTHER ASPECrS OF THE PROPOSAL
Although I have described the essentials of the congressional in-
vestigation proposal, there are several other aspects that warrant dis-
cussion. In this Part, I discuss three questions: Should the investiga-
tive committee be placed in the House of Representatives, the Senate,
or both? Would congressional investigations be as effective as investi-
gations by the executive branch? Is there any chance that the majority
party in Congress would be willing to enact this proposal?
A. The Location of the Committee
One important question is whether the specially appointed inves-
tigative committee should be located in the House, the Senate, or
both chambers. The most obvious arrangement, based on existing
practice, would be for each house to establish a separate committee.
The main problem with separate committees, however, is coordinat-
ing their independent actions. If both the House and Senate commit-
tees were to investigate a matter, that might unduly burden witnesses
who would have to answer questions twice. Moreover, one commit-
tee's investigation could interfere with the second committee's inquiry
if, for example, the first committee granted immunity to a witness or
recommended prosecution to the executive branch. The committees
might be able to address these problems, however, by establishing an
agreement or guidelines to coordinate their investigations. Moreover,
even if there were coordination problems, one might argue that these
would be outweighed by the benefits produced by competition be-
tween the committees.
If coordinating two committees were deemed to be a significant
problem, Congress could establish a single investigative committee.
This could be done in one of two ways. First, investigations might be
assigned exclusively to one of the houses. Some might argue that the
House of Representatives should conduct the investigations, because
the House possesses the exclusive power to determine whether to im-
peach an official. Defenders of the Senate might counter, however,
that the Senate possesses the power of oversight and has historically
conducted effective investigations."'
Alternatively, Congress could establish a joint House-Senate inves-
tigative committee with half of the members from each chamber. The
101 See GRABow, supra note 34, §§ 2.3, 2.5 (discussing successful Senate investiga-
tions of Teapot Dome and Watergate).
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houses have often formed joint committees when both chambers want
to pursue a matter and to coordinate their actions. °2 This joint com-
mittee would have the advantage of providing a coordinated investiga-
tion and allowing both houses to participate. One drawback of ajoint
committee, however, is that it might be more difficult to find a single
committee structure acceptable to the political parties in both houses.
B. The Effectiveness of the Committee
One possible objection to the congressional investigation proposal
is that it would not be as effective at uncovering information as execu-
tive branch investigations. Investigators need to be able to induce
lower-level officials and others to provide information about wrongdo-
ing by higher-level officials. Criminal prosecutors, the argument con-
tinues, would be able to secure more cooperation because they have
both the stick of threatening to prosecute someone who does not co-
operate as well as the carrot of providing immunity to someone who
does. Congressional committees, on the other hand, can not crimi-
nally prosecute and therefore would have to rely entirely on the carrot
of immunity.
While this objection is not without force, there is reason to believe
that the committee would have adequate tools for uncovering infor-
mation. Although the committee itself could not criminally prose-
cute, it could refer incriminating evidence to the executive branch
with a strong recommendation that it prosecute. Although prosecu-
tors might be hesitant to pursue a case that would further an investiga-
tion against executive officials, this reduced incentive could be ad-
dressed by a statute requiring the executive to justify in writing any
decision it made not to prosecute. Additionally, the committee could
use its powers to induce an individual to cooperate with its investiga-
tion. If an individual refused to cooperate, the committee could
threaten to require her to publicly testify or to write a public report
detailing her behavior. Such actions could significantly damage the
individual's reputation. They might also increase the chances that the
executive would prosecute her.
In addition to these powers, congressional investigations would
have certain advantages over executive branch investigations. The
congressional committee could secure information by offering immu-
102 See id. § 2.6[b] (discussing thejoint investigation and hearings conducted by the
House and Senate Iran-Contra Committees); How CONGRESS WORKS, supra note 58, at
143.
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nity to the target of the investigation. Executive branch prosecutors
would not use this tactic, because their main goal is to convict people
who have violated the law. Congressional investigations, by contrast,
are intended to uncover information rather than to prosecute indi-
viduals. Thus, the committee might be willing to offer immunity from
criminal prosecution in exchange for the target admitting wrongdo-
ing and resigning her position. Congressional investigations would
also avoid having to comply with the strict requirements that govern
criminal prosecutions, such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt and
the various rights enjoyed by criminal defendants.
Finally, the members of the investigative committee may have
strong political incentives to conduct an effective investigation. An
investigation of a high executive official that leads to her dismissal is
often a significant political event. Especially if the public regards it as
fair, the investigation might significantly enhance the political reputa-
tions of the committee members. To mention just one example,
Senator Sam Ervin went from being an ordinary U.S. Senator to a na-
tional symbol of integrity as a result of the Watergate investigation.
The opportunity to gain public esteem would give members of the
committee an incentive to vigorously pursue investigations-but only
if their investigations were seen as legitimate.
In the end, there is a strong argument that congressional investi-
gations would be at least as effective as executive investigations. But
even if congressional investigations were a little less effective than ex-
ecutive investigations, it is not clear that this should be regarded as a
significant defect. After years of overly aggressive independent coun-
sels, less vigorous investigations might be just what the Republic
needs.
C. Incentives To Adopt the Proposal
A final objection to the congressional investigation proposal is
that, even if it would be good policy, it will never be enacted because it
requires the majority party to voluntarily reduce its power. Under ex-
isting institutions, if the majority party deems the investigative com-
mittee to be sufficiently important, it has the option of appointing
committee members who will reliably vote as the median voter of the
party desires.' By contrast, under the interparty appointment proc-
103 That is, instead of appointing members who reflect the views of all of the party's
members-the most extreme, the middle, and the most moderate-the majority party
can appoint a group of members consisting only of the middle and the most extreme.
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ess, the committee would tend to be composed of the most moderate
members of both parties and the balance of power would probably be
held by the moderate members of the majority party. Thus, the me-
dian voter in the majority party would probably prefer the existing
appointment method. Because the median voter of the majority party
is normally positioned so that the leadership of the majority party re-104
flects her preferences and because that leadership can largely pre-
vent the congressional investigation proposal from being voted
upon, 05 one can predict that the majority party would not allow the
congressional investigation proposal to be enacted. Since, according
to this view, the proposal cannot be enacted, it is not worth discuss-
ing.1
0 6
This objection, however, is mistaken. Although the proposal
would not clearly benefit existing powerholders, it would not clearly
harm them either. Rather, its effects on existing powerholders would
be mixed and would depend on public opinion, and therefore, are
hard to predict. Depending on how the public and the different
members of the majority coalition viewed the proposal, the majority
coalition might actually support it.
There are several reasons why the majority party might support
the proposal. First, although the proposal would impose costs on the
majority party, it would also provide benefits. It is true that when
This group can then vote as a block to ensure that the committee consistently takes
actions that the party's median members would desire.
104 According to one influential theory within the field of positive political theory,
the preferences of the median or middle voter will generally prevail in institutions that
are subject to majority rule. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, at 65-66
(1989).
105 See How CONGRESS WORKs, supra note 58, at 69, 76, 89 (discussing how con-
gressional leadership controls the legislative process).
106 One might argue that the median voter in the entire house controls the house
rather than the median voter of the majority party. If an ordinary bill were opposed by
the median voter of the majority party, but had the support of the moderate members
of that party and the entire minority party, it might pass. Why, then, would not the
moderate members of the majority party join with the entire minority party to select
members for the investigatory committee? There are many reasons why this would not
happen; here, I will mention just one. In legislatures, certain votes are deemed to be
matters of party loyalty. Practically, a party member cannot vote against the party's po-
sition and remain a member of the party in good standing. This would usually be true
of a vote on committee memberships. See id. at 121 (describing the method for ap-
pointing committee members, which generally allows leadership to make the deci-
sions); id. at 7 (describing actions leadership can take to punish disloyal members).
Thus, the most moderate members of the majority party would be unlikely to defect
from their party's position on this issue, except in the unlikely event that they believed
the composition of this one committee was more important than their membership in
good standing in the party.
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there is divided government, a specially appointed committee would
probably investigate less aggressively than an ordinary committee con-
trolled by the majority party. The actions that the specially appointed
committee would take, however, would command wider support from
the members of the committee and might even pass unanimously.
Consequently, the committee's actions would have more credibility
and therefore more influence with the public. Because the principal
effect of a congressional investigation occurs through its influence on
the public, the enhanced credibility of investigations by specially ap-
pointed committees would be a significant benefit to the majority
party.
Second, the majority party would also benefit to the extent that
voters believed the party had adopted a worthy proposal. That is, if
the public favored the proposal, its passage by the majority party
might increase the public's support for the party.' °' Finally, the major-
ity party might also adopt the proposal if the party believed it would
be good public policy. Although politicians often take actions based
on their interests, sometimes they act from their genuine beliefs about
the public good. They are especially likely to do so when a measure's
effects on their interests seem to be relatively neutral-which appears
to be true of the congressional investigation proposal.
Thus, there is a reasonable chance that a majority party might
choose to support the proposal, and therefore, one cannot dismiss it
as utopian. Indeed, because the probability of its enactment depends
in part on how the public views it, there is all the more reason to ex-
amine the public policy arguments for adopting it.
CONCLUSION
Now that the nation has apparently discarded the Independent
Counsel statute, with what should we replace it? While most commen-
tators propose that the executive branch investigate itself, this Essay
argues that Congress should investigate executive wrongdoing.
Although the existing congressional investigation process is
flawed, it can be improved. Congress should establish a committee
with the sole function of investigating executive branch misconduct.
Because it is essential that the committee not spend its time engaged
107 The public might be especially grateful at a time when the nation professes to
be weary from the partisan fights that occurred during the investigation and im-
peachment of President Clinton. See David S. Broder & Dan Balz, A Year of Scandal with
No Winners, WASH. PosT, Feb. 11, 1999, atAl.
REPLA CTNG INDEPENDENT COUNSELS
in partisan disputes, each political party should choose the committee
members from the opposing party.
Congress should also provide the investigative committee with
adequate powers. The committee should be empowered to bring a
civil action in federal court in order to enforce its subpoenas. The
committee should also have the power to allow its staff to question
witnesses who are under oath so that committee members are not
overly burdened by their investigative duties.
This congressional investigative system would be superior to ex-
ecutive branch investigations. Under this system, the persons con-
ducting the investigation would be both independent of presidential
control and accountable to the voters. The committee members
would also tend to be political moderates and to have integrity. In
addition, the system would not give the investigators an undue incen-
tive to find that the targets of the investigation were guilty. Finally,
congressional investigations would avoid the many problems created
when criminal prosecutions are used to monitor executive miscon-
duct.
Although the original Constitution envisioned that Congress
would monitor and remedy executive misconduct, modem innova-
tions have led to a system that relies primarily on executive branch in-
vestigations. It is now time to return to the Constitution's approach
and to construct an investigative system based on it. As is so often the
case, we do best when we build on the foundations erected by the
Framers.
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